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Abstract
Sense-and-avoid (SAA) is a critical research topic for en-
abling the operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
in civilian airspace. SAA involves two planning related prob-
lems: 1) plan-recognition to predict the future trajectory of
nearby aircraft, and 2) path planning to avoid conflicts with
nearby aircraft that pose a threat. We have designed and built
components of a novel intelligent sense-and-avoid (iSAA)
reasoning framework that takes into account information
about aircraft type, transponder code, communications, local
routes, airports, airspace, terrain, and weather to more accu-
rately predict near- and medium-term trajectories of nearby
aircraft. By using this additional information both the on-
board control software and the ground-based UAS operator
can make more informed, intelligent decisions to effectively
predict and avoid conflicts and maintain separation. While
this capability benefits all categories of UASs operating under
both Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and Visual Flight Rules
(VFR), it is absolutely essential for allowing smaller UASs to
operate VFR at low altitude in uncontrolled airspace for oper-
ations such as survey work, wildlife tracking, aerial photog-
raphy, utilities inspection, crop dusting, and package delivery.
Introduction
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) come in a wide range
of sides, from tiny to quite large as illustrated in Figure 1.
As you would expect, they have an equally wide range of
performance characteristics and capabilities, including cost,
operating altitudes, range, speed, instrumentation, commu-
nication abilities, and payload capacity. To date, UASs have
been used predominantly for military applications, but there
is growing demand to employ these vehicles for a wide
range of civilian purposes, including such things as: search
and rescue, traffic monitoring and reporting, wildlife mon-
itoring and surveys, fire and flood monitoring, pipeline and
transmission line inspection, aerial photography, cropdust-
ing, and package delivery. All of these applications, require
operation of UASs in civilian airspace at lower altitudes. To
date, UASs have essentially been operated under Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR), which means that they have to adhere to
a strict flight plan, and Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) have
authority over their operation and route. This is not practical
for smaller vehicles, for vehicles operating at low altitudes
(below radar coverage), and for many of the applications en-
visioned for these vehicles. To operate in this environment,
Figure 1: Some small, medium, and large UASs with widely
varying performance and capabilities.
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Figure 2: Scope of traffic advisories (TA) and resolution ad-
visories (RA) for TCAS II.
these vehicles must be able to operate under Visual Flight
Rules (VFR), and be able to Sense and Avoid (SAA) other
aircraft in the same way that most small aircraft currently
operate.
There are many aspects to the SAA problem including
sensor technology, sensor integration, communication tech-
nology and security, threat recognition, and threat resolu-
tion. Because of the interest in UASs, there has been a great
deal of work on many of these topics. The focus of this
work is on the threat recognition and resolution problems,
for which we assume a variety of inputs from various possi-
ble sensors and sources.
Related Work
Since 2000, the Traffic Collision and Avoidance System
(TCAS II) (Federal Aviation Administration 2011) has been
required in many countries (including the US, Europe,
China, Australia and India) on all large commercial trans-
port aircraft. TCAS is designed to reduce the chances of
mid-air collision with other transponder or TCAS equipped
aircraft by issuing advisories and threat resolutions to the
TCAS equipped aircraft. It does this by 1) projecting the
current track of any nearby aircraft (intruder) into the fu-
ture, 2) recognizing if this poses a threat of a Near Mid-Air
Collision (NMAC), and 3) issuing a resolution advisory to
avoid the NMAC. If both aircraft are TCAS equipped, the
advisories are automatically coordinated to ensure that the
responses do not conflict. Figure 2 illustrates the scope of
TCAS reasoning and advisories.
While TCAS has reduced the incidence of NMACS for
larger aircraft, there are a number of limitations with the sys-
tem. First, the cost, hardware and power requirements limit
installation to larger aircraft. Second, the system projects
that the intruder will continue on its current course. While
this may be a reasonable assumption for en-route aircraft op-
erating at higher altitudes, it is less accurate, and less robust
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logic table to determine the best action to take—that is, 
whether to issue an advisory and if so, what vertical rate 
to use. This processing chain is repeated once per second 
with every new sensor measurement [8]. 
Critical to understanding the logic optimization pro-
cess are two important concepts. The first is a Markov 
decision process, which is essentially the probabilistic 
dynamic model combined with the utility model. The 
second is dynamic programming, which is the iterative 
computational process used to optimize the logic.
Markov Decision Processes
Markov decision processes (MDP) are a general frame-
work for formulating sequential decision problems [9]. 
The concept has been around since the 1950s, and it has 
been applied to a wide variety of important problems. 
The idea is very simple, but the effective application can 
be very complex. Figure 5 shows a small MDP with three 
states, but to adequately represent the collision avoidance 
problem, as many as 10 million states may be required—
the states representing the state of the aircraft involved, 
including its position and velocity.
Available from each state is a set of actions. In Fig-
ure 5, actions A and B are available from all three states. 
In the collision avoidance problem, the actions corre-
spond to the various resolution advisories available to the 
system. Depending on the current state and the action 
taken, the next state is determined probabilistically. For 
example, if action A is taken from state 2 in the example 
MDP, there is a 60% chance that the next state will be 1 
and a 40% chance the next state will be 2.
The benefits or rewards of any action are generated 
when transitions are made. Rewards can be positive, such 
as +1 and +5 in the example, or they can be negative like <10 
for making the transition from state 3 to state 2 by action B. 
In the collision avoidance problem, there are large costs for 
near midair collisions and small costs for issuing resolution 
advisories to the pilots. There are also costs for reversing 
the direction of the advisory and increasing the required 
vertical rate. The objective in an MDP is to choose actions 
intelligently to maximize the accumulation of rewards, or, 
equivalently, minimize the accumulation of costs.
Dynamic Programming
Dynamic programming is an efficient way to solve an 
MDP [10]. The first step involves discretizing the state 
space. Figure 6 shows a notional representation of the 
state space, where the discrete states are represented as 
boxes. In this simple representation, the vertical axis rep-
resents altitude relative to the other aircraft, and the hori-
zontal axis represents time. The time at which a potential 
collision occurs corresponds to the rightmost column. The 
FIGURE 4. ACAS X performs state estimation and action selection once per second. Based on new sensor measurements 
and models of the dynamics and sensors, the system updates its estimate of the state of the aircraft. Uncertainty in the state 
estimate is represented as a probability distribution. This distribution specifies where to look in a table to determine which 




















Figure 3: Architectu e f ACAS X, rom (Kochenderfer et
al. 2012).
within the t rminal area, particularly for smaller intruders
operating VFR at low altitudes. Third, the resolution logic
o sist of and generated heuristic rules, which e i com-
plete and difficult to verify. Finally, the system is designed
for ly short-ter conflict resoluti n (25-40 seconds from
NMAC). As a result, the resolution advisors are fairly ag-
gressive maneuvers, a d are restricted to actions of climb-
ing, descending, and otherwise constraining vertical speed.
There are no horizontal avoidance actions.
The ACAS X system (Kochenderfer et al. 2012) is a pro-
posed successor to TCAS II that is currently undergoing test-
ing and evaluation. ACAS X improves on several of TCAS
II’s limitations in particular, it is 1) capable of utilizing po-
sitional information fr m a broader range of ources, 2) it
uses a probabilistic model of the intruders likely trajectory,
and 3) the res lut n logic is based on offline solution f an
MDP, and is therefore more systematic, complete, and ro-
bust. As a result, ACAS X has demonstrated the ability to
resolve more conflicts, while issuing fewer unnecessary res-
olution advisories. The architecture of ACAS X is shown
in Figure 3. Unfortunately, ACAS X is still aimed at short-
term conflict resolution, and the advisories are still limited
to climbing, descending, and constraint of vertical speed.
Approach
In this work, we are interested in addressing medium-term
conflict avoidance for small UASs operating VFR at low al-
titude in a mixed air traffic environment. By medium-term
we mean detecting and resolving conflicts between 30 and
120 seconds before they would occur. By doing this, we can
maintain greater separation between aircraft, and conflicts
can be resolved using less aggressive and less costly maneu-
vers. On the negative side, it is more difficult to accurately
predict the trajectory of another aircraft this far in advance.
The focus on VFR operation at low altitudes also presents
challenges: 1) trajectories are less predictable for VFR traf-
fic, and 2) terrain and weather may be a significant factor
in predicting those trajectories and resolving conflicts – no-
tably, aircraft operating VFR are required to maintain certain
clearances from clouds and terrain, both vertically and hori-
zontally.
We regard the problem of predicting the future trajectory


















Figure 5: Probabilistic Intruder Prediction for ACAS X.
olution is a problem of path planning under uncertainty. We
believe that both of these are knowledge intensive processes
that rely on more than just the previously observed trajectory
of the aircraft. In particular, prediction needs to take advan-
tage of information about such things as aircraft type, local
routes and traffic patterns, transponder operation, commu-
nications, terrain and weather. Conflict resolution needs to
take account of many of the same things as well as the goals
of the UAS.
To illustrate this, consider the simple example shown in
Figure 4. Here, a UAS and another aircraft (the intruder) are
both at 1000 ft AGL (above ground level) on intersecting
courses. TCAS II would predict that the intruder would re-
main on its present (straight and level) course resulting in a
conflict at the point X. Somewhere between 25 and 40 sec-
onds before the intersection, the TCAS logic would advise
an aggressive climb to avoid the intruder. Figure 5 shows
the difference for the ACAS X model: here there is a proba-
bilistic model of the possible future positions of the intruder
(derived from real data of aircraft tracks).
In Figure 6 there is one piece of additional information
available – the intruder aircraft is downwind from Runway
27 at an uncontrolled airport. In this case, if the aircraft is














Figure 6: Intelligent threat prediction.
pattern for this airport, and will be turning on a base leg, and
then final leg as shown in Figure 6. As a result, the probabil-
ity distribution for the future location of the aircraft should
be strongly biased towards turning base. If we have addi-
tional information that the aircraft is descending, or that the
landing gear is down, then it is even more likely that the
aircraft will turn base and there will not be any conflict. In
contrast, if we know that the aircraft is climbing, or that the
landing gear is up, or that it has a discrete transponder code
then it is more likely that the aircraft is on a downwind de-
parture from the airport, and will not be turning base. Like-
wise, if the wind is strongly favoring the opposite runway
(Runway 09), or the traffic pattern is on the south side of the
airport rather than the north side (left traffic instead of right
traffic), or the runway is too short for this type of aircraft,
then it is even less likely that the aircraft will turn base; in
fact, it is unlikely that the aircraft is in the traffic pattern for
this airport at all.
What’s happening here is that information about local
routes, aircraft type, wind conditions, and other factors can
have a huge influence on our prediction of the track of the in-
truder. Terrain, thunderstorms, and airspace restrictions, can
have a similar effect. All of these factors are evidence that
needs to play a role in the prediction problem.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we first de-
scribe our system architecture for medium-term threat de-
tection using probabilistic plan recognition techniques, and
describe the current status of our implementation and inte-
gration with the ACES traffic simulation environment. We
then discuss our intended future work on: 1) improving our
prediction algorithm by automatically generating dynamic
Bayesian Networks tailored to the location of the intruder;
and 2) developing medium-term threat resolution software
utilizing fast online probabilistic path planning.
System Architecture
Sense-and-avoid procedures generally involve the following
steps: 1) intruder detection – identify nearby aircraft, 2)
threat detection – predict the trajectory of potential intrud-
ers and decide if any may cause a threat to the intended flight
Trajectory Prediction 
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Figure 7: SAA Software Architecture
path, 3) threat resolution – devise an appropriate course of
action to avoid the threat.
Figure 7 shows how these different components work to-
gether to provide the pilot/operator with a set of evasion ma-
neuvers whenever a threat is detected. The Airspace Con-
cept Evaluation System (ACES) (Airspace Systems Divi-
sion, NASA Ames Research Center ) is a simulation en-
vironment for the National Airspace that has been devel-
oped at NASA Ames Research Center. ACES includes an
example SAA implementation called GenericSAA which
follows this architecture. Since GenericSAA constitutes a
working implementation that is compatible with our concep-
tual model of the problem, we have adopted it and enhanced
it to fit our approach.
The intruder detection component is relatively straight-
forward, as it consists of applying specific vertical and hor-
izontal separation thresholds for any aircraft detected in the
vicinity of the ownship. In some cases any detected aircraft
will automatically be considered an intruder, depending on
the capabilities of the sensors available to the aircraft.
The threat detection component consists of trajectory
prediction and threat evaluation. We have formulated a
probabilistic approach that predicts the trajectories of poten-
tial intruders given their historical paths and relevant knowl-
edge about the aircraft and the region. Figure 8 shows the
components of our trajectory prediction framework, which
feeds into the threat evaluation component:
Leg Extraction: unlike existing algorithms that utilize
only the intruders observed trajectory as points to help pre-
dict short-term future trajectory points, we go one step fur-
ther in extracting trajectory legs. A trajectory leg is a contin-
uous portion of the trajectory where the aircraft is in a par-
ticular mode such as: climbing, turning right, flying straight,
etc. A sequence of legs reveals the flights pattern and helps
predict subsequent legs. We have built new software to ex-
tract legs from the observed state information for an aircraft
based on three state variables: 1) speed; 2) altitude; and 3)
heading.
Route Database: To understand the intent of each trajec-
tory leg, we match it against defined route segments in the
area. For example, if an observed aircraft is downwind for
an active runway, is at traffic pattern altitude, and is level or
descending, its very likely that it will subsequently turn on
a base leg for the runway. We constructed a database of legs
for traffic patterns, instrument approach procedures, and air-
ways for an interesting test area near Sacramento, CA that
contains several airports and a mix of different kinds of traf-
fic. Each leg is described by its name, type, start and end
fixes, altitudes for those fixes, heading, lateral tolerance, al-
titude tolerance, and heading tolerance. These tolerances are
much tighter for something like an instrument approach than
for something like a federal airway, or crosswind departure.
Segment Matching: we developed and built an algorithm
to match the trajectory legs, created from the observed his-
tory of an intruders trajectory, to the segments in the route
database. Our matching algorithm decides that a leg L could
be a given route segment S in our database if all points in
L 1) are located within the geometric region defined by Ss
start/end points and tolerances, and 2) have heading bounded
by Ss heading and heading-tolerance values.
Predicting Future Intruder Trajectory: we use a Dynamic
Bayesian Network to infer the probabilities of different op-
tions that the intruder might pursue next. We constructed
our Bayesian Net utilizing the open source JavaBayes pack-
age. In addition to any route segment matches for the ob-
served trajectory legs (described above), the Bayesian Net-
work has variables representing many pieces of information
that might be available about the intruder and area: 1) VFR
or IFR; 2) transponder code; 3) aircraft characteristics (e.g.
aircraft size, wing type, tail type, number of engines, engine
type, observed gear position); 4) communications on rele-
vant frequencies, 5) ceiling and visibility, and 6) wind direc-
tion and intensity. Feeding this information as evidence into
the Bayesian Network, we are able to infer the probabilities
of possible next legs, or other actions by the intruder.
Threat Evaluation: Our trajectory prediction algorithm re-
turns multiple possible medium-term future trajectories with
associated probabilities for each aircraft. Threat Evaluation
consists of taking these trajectory predictions and detecting
possible loss-of-separation violations during the time hori-
zon for the SAA algorithm (30-120secs in our case). We
carry this out by performing a fine-grained (1sec) discretiza-
tion of all of the probabilistic trajectories, mapping them
to a 2D data structure (ignoring altitude) and reporting any
possible overlaps. We currently inherit the GenericSAA ap-
proach, which filters out aircraft flying at different altitude
form the ownship’s, this simplification eventually needs to
be removed to account correctly for intruders that are rapidly
climbing or descending.
Threat Resolution: The threat evaluation component re-
turns a set of probabilistic trajectories that potentially vi-
olate loss-of-separation thresholds within the time horizon
for the SAA algorithm. Threat Resolution consists of com-
Figure 8: Trajectory Prediction Architecture
puting aircraft maneuvers which will steer the ownship clear
of the trajectories that pose threats. This is typically done
by choosing from a set of maneuvers that eliminate con-
flicts and optimize some risk/benefit function. We propose
a probabilistic threat resolution approach explained in detail
in a subsequent section. Currently, we reuse the approach
implemented by the GenericSAA framework, which has the
following characteristics: 1) Only the most immediate threat
is addressed. 2) Resolutions are computed by examining a
small set of maneuvers that modify one of {Horizontal Po-
sition, Altitude, Speed}, in that order. 3) The first maneuver
that yields a conflict-free trajectory projection is chosen as
the solution, no optimization is performed at this point.
We have implemented most of the elements in our Tra-
jectory Prediction architecture: Leg Extraction, Segment
Matchings, and Route Prediction using a Dynamic Bayesian
Network. For the time being we have manually created
Route Database entries for a small test area near Sacra-
mento, CA. We have integrated our probabilistic trajectory
prediction with ACES’ GenericSAA framework. Generic-
SAA provides Threat Evaluation and Threat Resolution
functionality and therefore allows us to evaluate our ap-
proach in the context of a complete SAA solution. For veri-
fication purposes we have also built a lightweight simulation
and visualization mechanism (Figure 9) that allows us to 1)
Set up intruder and ownship flights and 2) Step through time
to incrementally visualize the aircraft states, projected tra-
jectories, computed threats and computed threat resolution
maneuvers.
Improving Probabilistic Path Prediction
As described in the previous section, we developed a proto-
type dynamic Bayesian Network model that takes advantage
of knowledge about aircraft, routes, traffic patterns, topog-
raphy, airspace, weather information, and observed commu-
nications in order to better predict the path of an intruder
aircraft. While this additional information can be very pow-
erful, the states in the Bayesian network must be tailored to
the specific area of the intruder. For example, if the intruder
is near a particular airport, then possible next states for the
Figure 9: SAA Simulator
aircraft may include traffic pattern legs or approach legs for
that airport. However, if the aircraft is at 4000 ft AGL, then
those legs are not relevant as possible next states for the air-
craft. In our current prototype, we dodged this issue by in-
cluding all possible states for the local area whether or not
they were reachable by the intruder within the time window
of interest. This resulted in the current and next state nodes
in the Bayesian network having more than 30 possible val-
ues. As a result, the conditional probability tables for some
of these nodes required more than 1000 entries. Although
most of the entries in this table are zero, it is impractical to
generate these tables by hand for anything other than a lim-
ited geographical area. In addition, the conditional probabil-
ity tables are not very compact or easy to understand. Based
on our experience, we believe that it is possible to encode
this information much more succinctly, and automatically
generate the Bayesian network for a particular location. The
key to this is to recognize that traffic patterns and procedures
at an airport can be encoded as probabilistic automata. For
each leg in the procedure there are a set of possible succes-


























Figure 10: Bayesian Network capturing probabilistically the relation between different characteristics of the intruder aircraft
and how they can be used to infer the probability of what the intruder may do next.
influenced by factors such as aircraft type, airspeed, vertical
speed, transponder code, etc. As a result, each set of transi-
tions for a leg form a small dynamic Bayesian network. Fig-
ure 10 provides an illustration of what this automata looks
like for a typical airport traffic pattern. An aircraft remain-
ing in the pattern (practicing landings) would transition from
Takeoff to Upwind to Crosswind (Xwind) to Downwind
(Dwind) to Base to Final. There are multiple possible tran-
sitions at many of the nodes. For example, from downwind,
the aircraft could transition to a close-in base (Base1) a more
distant base (Base2), could depart downwind, or do an over-
head 270 departure. The probabilities of these different op-
tions are influenced by other factors, such as aircraft type,
speed, climb/descent, altitude, transponder code, communi-
cations, etc. We believe that most of this information can be
encoded generically for traffic patterns, approaches, depar-
tures, and airways, and that we can automatically generate
the appropriate dynamic Bayesian Network for any specific
location.
We recognize that our approach to “plan recognition” is
rather specialized for aircraft trajectories. We have consid-
ered recent approaches such as that of Ramirez and Geffner
(2010). The trouble is that for this problem there is lit-
tle ability to predict the long term goal of the aircraft. In-
stead, we are interested in predicting the next plan or tra-
jectory steps. In addition, the computational overhead of the
Ramirez/Geffner approach is substantial and would proba-
bly be impractical for this domain. One can, however, think
of the dynamic Bayesian Network as encoding the informa-
Lateral resolution actions Vertical resolution actions
Standard rate left turn Climb 1000 ft/min
Half standard rate left turn Climb 500 ft/min
Straight Level
Half standard rate right turn Descend 500 ft/min
Standard rate right turn Descend 1000 ft/min
Table 1: Resolution action.
tion that would be obtained from an approach like that of
Ramirez/Geffner – the probability of each possible next plan
step is influenced by the previous actions of the aircraft, as
well as the probability of the possible goals.
Medium-term Probabilistic Threat Resolution
Systems such as TCAS and ACAS X are designed to detect
and avoid near term conflicts between aircraft conflicts that
would occur in a time frame between zero and 45 seconds.
If a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) is imminent (within
25 seconds) they issue a resolution advisory that involves
climbing, descending, or constraining vertical speed (e.g.
maintain climb, or do not descend). Because these systems
deal with near term critical situations, the resolution advi-
sories can be dramatic in nature, and can be disruptive and
inefficient for the intended flight path of one or both aircraft.
It is clearly desirable to have medium or longer term
conflict detection and avoidance, so that near-term conflict
Figure 11: The lateral and vertical action spaces for threat resolution. For lateral maneuvers, standard and half-standard rate
turns are considered every 15 seconds resulting in heading changes of 45 and 22.5 degrees respectively. For vertical maneuvers,
500 and 1000 ft/min climb and descent are considered every 15 seconds.
avoidance can be minimized. In particular, we would like to
recognize potential conflicts up to two minutes in advance,
resolve them using less abrupt maneuvers, and keep the air-
craft well clear of each other. Furthermore, for smaller air-
craft and UASs operating at lower altitudes, climbing and
descending is often not the best approach for resolving con-
flicts descent may be limited by terrain or obstacles, and
climb may be limited by performance, clouds, or airspace.
As a result, most conflicts between VFR aircraft are resolved
by heading changes to go around or pass behind the other
aircraft.
Our objective is to develop and test an algorithm for
medium-term conflict resolution conflicts that are predicted
in the time frame between 30 seconds and 2 minutes. We
assume a probabilistic model of the possible pose (location,
airspeed, vertical speed, heading, and turn rate) for the in-
truder aircraft as a function of time. In particular, the model
developed and described earlier may predict specific future
actions with high probability for the intruder based on infer-
ence that the intruder is on a particular route, approach, or
traffic pattern, or based on weather, terrain, or airspace con-
straints. We intend to consider both lateral resolutions (e.g.
standard rate left turn), and altitude resolutions (e.g. descend
500 ft/min) as shown in Table 1.
The vertical resolutions in Table 1 are much gentler than
those considered by TCAS and ACAS X for two reasons: 1)
most small aircraft are limited to sustained climb rates be-
tween 1000 ft/min and 1500 ft/min, and 2) because of the
longer time horizon, climbs and descents do not need to be
aggressive. From the initial state of our aircraft, each ver-
tical and lateral possibility will be considered at each time
step, which we will take to be every 15 seconds. Given that
there are 6 time steps from 2 minutes until 30 seconds, and
25 action combinations at each time step, this results in a
state space of 256 or approximately 250 million states. How-
ever, the vertical and lateral spaces can be considered inde-
pendently, resulting in two spaces of approximately 16,000
states each, a much more manageable number. An illustra-
tion of the lateral and vertical state spaces are shown in the
Figure 11.
There are costs associated with the different actions that
the aircraft can take. In particular, there is a cost associated
with initiating each new action (other than none), and more
aggressive actions cost more than less aggressive actions.
Given the distribution of possible projected locations for the
intruder, each of the leaf states in this state tree can be given
a value based on the clearance from the intruder, and the
cost of returning to the original route. Using dynamic pro-
gramming, this information can be backed up through the
state space to find the best action at each time step. This
approach, is similar to the approach taken in ACAS X, but
there are some differences:
1. The action space is quite different we are considering
both lateral and vertical actions, but the actions are less
aggressive.
2. The time horizon is much longer, but we use much coarser
time steps because the conflict is farther off.
However, the most critical difference is due to our knowl-
edge intensive approach to prediction of the course of the in-
truder. Because the probability distribution for the intruder
is influenced by location (routes, weather, terrain), the val-
ues on the leaf nodes of the MDP are dependent on the par-
ticular situation. As a result, the MDP cannot be solved in
advance and compiled into a decision table as in ACAS X
instead it must be solved in real time. Given the size of the
MDP, we believe that this can be done in a few seconds. If
this turns out not to be the case, we can resort to approxi-
mate policy generation methods for solving the MDP, which
would reduce solution time. Because of the medium-term
time frame, optimal solution of the MDP is not as important
as for ACAS X.
One final difference between this approach and that of
ACAS X is that the value of each leaf node is also influenced
by the cost of returning the UAS to its intended course. De-
viating more from the intended course increases the penalty,
and this must be balanced with maintaining clearance from
the intruder. There is no consideration of this issue in TCAS
or ACAS X.
Conclusion
There is growing demand to operate UASs in civilian
airspace. Enabling this will require much better sense-and-
avoid technology, so that UASs of vastly different sizes
and capabilities can maintain separation from other aircraft.
While most current research has concentrated on near-term
collision detection and avoidance utilizing only the observed
trajectory history of an aircraft, we target mid-term detection
and avoidance utilizing a variety of information beyond just
aircraft trajectory.
We concentrated on two tasks: (1) conflict detection: uti-
lizing probabilistic path recognition; and (2) conflict reso-
lution: utilizing fast online probabilistic path planning. Our
work is preliminary. We have implemented the components
necessary for the conflict detection portion and integrated it
with the ACES traffic simulation system. We are refining
and improving the dynamic Bayesian Network prediction
and plan to implement our probabilistic conflict resolution
approach. We hope to evaluate the techniques using a large
database of actual air traffic trajectories that have been col-
lected and made available through related efforts at NASA.
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